Introduction
This paper is an elaboration of my opening keynote lecture at the conference on Quantum Probability and the Mathematical Modelling of Decision Making held at the Fields Institute, Toronto, 9-11 March 2015. The keywords on the announcement poster for that meeting were, in order: quantum probability, probabilistic contextuality, quantum mechanics, decision making, psychology, economics, and new avenues of research. I started my lecture by selecting and reordering among those to: decision making, psychology, economics, and quantum probability.
In other words, I wanted to make clear that my priority would be the key issue of decision making. As many in the audience knew, I have been involved for many years in various aspects of quantum mechanics, and have published significantly enough within its literature. But not many in the audience, perhaps none of them, knew of the interesting work I did jointly with the physicist Jakob Bernasconi in the 10-year period 1988-1998, in which we performed experiments and analysis comparing the performance of artificial intelligence learning and generalization methods (symbolic, neural-net and pattern) with that of humans. We published those results in four papers [1] [2] [3] [4] . I returned to them briefly within a later paper [5] . Here, as this forum seems an appropriate place to do so, I want to focus on and bring new light especially to the human aspect.
Therefore, in §2, as in my lecture, I will go back to that 10-year experiment: why we did it, and how we found that humans can outperform very good artificial intelligence algorithms and methods. This they are able to do only by subjective thinking. Subjective thinking requires forming mental contexts. We delved rather deeply into what it means to formulate mental context, especially when having to face quick decision-making tasks. See especially our last paper [4] .
In this present paper I am taking those investigations, that is, how humans quick-model when facing a (new) decision-making task, into more depth, and also to a broader domain, that of the general importance of imagination (or lack thereof) in artificial, human and quantum decision making. This is a huge domain for investigation, and I will be able to touch on only a few facets of it as I have perceived them.
In §3, I will bring this paper into the general context of this theme issue, which is, as I have taken it, decision making in psychology and economics, hopefully aided now by the introduction of methods from quantum mechanics, and also specifically, as I wish to do, as compared to the ever important human decision making. To lay down a convenient background for §3, I will rely mainly on two recent books [6, 7] . From those one may access a large related literature. In addition, during a memorable 2007 intimate conference on derivative finance, I found (see my account in [8] , Chapter 12) great respect for the thinking represented in the little book by Kreps [9] , to which I will also refer.
I will focus in §3 on how context and, more importantly, on how the formulation of context enters into the modelling of psychology and economics, and the more recent interjection of quantum probability methods being applied to those fields. To save time for the reader who does not want to go much further, let me admit here that I do not yet see enough added value to the issue of formulation of context brought so far by the quantum mechanical methods. That, if I might oversimplify here, is because quantum mechanics gives you only averages. Also, it models only with linear subspaces and vector bases for those subspaces. Finally, and I overstate this here, quantum mechanics seems to have no thinking, and possesses no human-like imagination.
In § §4 and 5 I push on, wanting to dig deeper into how context is formulated, especially by humans, and especially in their quick and new decision-making tasks. It seems to me that imagination is a crucial element to the success of humans over machines, and even to mathematical models put into those machines. I assume that imagination resides, and/or takes place, in the mind. So, I will also recall some of the well-known theories of mind. Then I bring in some conceptualizations of imagination by some of the great thinkers of all time. For a few specific illustrations, I speculatively also bring in some of our recorded human reasoning from the experiment discussed in §2.
I interject here: I can find no successful implementation of real human-like imagination capability into any of the six generations of computing systems to date. Of course, there have been many attempts, and no doubt some would claim some successes. It would, of course, depend on your agreed-upon conceptualization of the term imagination. 
Our experiment (1988-1998): artificial intelligence versus humans
In order to provide a motivating context for why Bernasconi and I happened to begin this experiment, here is some background. In 1988 I found myself as the only mathematician in a successful seven-department proposal that won a $22 million NSF grant to establish an Optoelectronic Computing Systems Center at the University of Colorado in Boulder, jointly with a smaller contingent of faculty from Colorado State University in Fort Collins. I had been quite involved during the previous 10 years with research in computational fluid dynamics with several of the engineering departments and with graduate students therein and also some of mine from the Department of Mathematics. Consequently it was natural to place me in charge of the algorithms to be tested on the hardware to be developed in the Optoelectronic Computing Systems Center. Although the Center had many facets and tasks, it can be said that a driving goal, a 'killer application' if you will, was to develop new hardware and software that could 'beat digital' on some important applications. We were free, essentially, to investigate and try anything, including neural networks, quantum computing, biological computing, applications in psychology, medicine, engineering or elsewhere. We did make valiant efforts in a number of those directions. Some very good PhDs were produced for the nation. The Center was lively and also drew in even more collateral supporting grants, including some from quite a few large corporate IT giants. Rumour has it that our interdisciplinary efforts, or more correctly and as I prefer to emphasize these days (see [10] ) our multidisciplinary efforts, brought in a total of about $50 million over the Center's 10-year span.
I had been a pioneer in the digital computer revolution (see my accounts in [8, 11] ), and I knew it would be very hard to beat digital. However, there was that ever-promised sixth generation of computing: intelligent machines that could think. Research in neural networks, especially as promoted by the advances of the parallel distributed processing crowd (see e.g. [12] ), was booming. By chance, at a conference I met the Swiss physicist Jakob Bernasconi of ABB (Asea Brown Boveri), who had been tasked by his organization to see if neural networks, or more generally, any of the algorithms or architectures of the machine learning community, could be trained as expert systems to emulate and perhaps beat the best financial traders. That would certainly be a nice 'killer application' considering the vast sums of money in play. We decided to join our interests in our spare time to learn the burgeoning artificial intelligence culture, which now with fast large digital computers was presumably capable of finally competing with human learning and intelligence, albeit perhaps only by large brute force.
We happened upon the paper and ID3 algorithm of Quinlan [13] . In that paper his principal application was to chess endgames. But he had used a very nice, much smaller classification problem to introduce and motivate his ID3 (Iterative Dichotomiser 3) algorithm. We noted that nowhere in his paper had he actually compared his ID3 results to human performance. So, we decided to do so. This small example, which we referred to simply as the Quinlan test, became the basis for our experiments.
At this point I told the Fields audience I would give them the same 'test' that we had given in our experiments from 1988 to 1998 to similar small samples of humans (as they became naturally available to us), a few details about which I will elaborate below. I told the Fields participants they need not take it. I also said not to worry, there was no 'right' answer, and could they just do it in the next 5 minutes? Here is the test. I take table 1 and figure 1 from [3] .
The task is to classify the set C' of the remaining objects 9, 10, 11 and 12, based upon the classifications assigned in the set C of given objects 1 to 8. And 'do it quickly', within about 5 min. The participants are only given table 1, and no instructions.
Quinlan's ID3 algorithm performs this classification based upon information theory. One looks at the three possible decision trees (figure 1).
The total information content of the classified objects C is given by Turning next to the possibility of choosing Hair as classification decision tree, we see that the 'red' branch is always '+' and the 'dark' branch is always '−', so those branches require no further information. The 'blond' branch information is
so the expected information content of these three lower branches is
Thus the information gain by choosing Hair as the top attribute is considerable:
The third possibility would be to choose Eyes as the top attribute. From the 'blue' branch with its three '+'s and two '−'s read off from the eight objects in the set C, we still need information of 0.971 (the entropy calculation is the same as for the 'tall' Height branch above), whereas the 'brown' branch always classifies as '−'. So, the expected information content of these two lower branches is 5
Thus the information gain by choosing Eyes as the top attribute is 0.954 − 0.607 = 0.347, which is not as good as that for Hair. Consequently, Quinlan's ID3 algorithm will choose the decision tree with Hair as the top attribute, and then classify the set C' accordingly. It thus classifies objects 9,10,11,12 of the set C as − + ++. Here I have presented the full ID3 entropy calculations because we did not bother to do so in our papers nor did Quinlan for this test. There can be little argument with the rationality of his algorithm. Why not first pick the attribute that gives you the quickest information gain? To date, ID3 and its later versions have accumulated more than 14 000 citations.
However, 25 years ago, Jakob and I both 'took' the test and we both classified objects 9,10,11,12, as −+−−. A few colleagues were tasked to classify without warning and the majority chose −+−−. There were a few for −+++ and also a few other classification choices appeared. Curious about these differences in the generalization behaviour between machine learning algorithms and humans, and among humans, our experiment was under way.
Here is a quick summary of our results based upon a total sample of 73 humans comprising 15 maternal languages from three continents. Each of the four contributing subsamples from different languages and locations gave consistent percentages. Our neural-net simulations over large randomized training data with a perceptron architecture found only five classifications of objects 9,10,11,12. The great backpropagation gradient descent algorithm almost always converged to the classification −+−−, so we backed off to single-and double-layer perceptron algorithms that permitted more solutions, albeit limited by a linear separation criterion incumbent to such schemes. 
We called those five classifications found by neural nets A (−+−−), B (−+++), C (−−−−), D (−+−+) and E (−++−).
The neural-net percentages finding those also created the A,B,C. . . order: A (72%), B (12%), C (9%), D (4%), E (3%). Humans, on the other hand, have preferred to date A (66%), B (8%), C (4%), D (10%), E (2%), with the remaining 10% of the humans choosing one of the other 11 possible classifications of objects 9,10,11,12. Note that the Eyes decision tree gives classification A when applied to the objects 9,10,11,12, and the Hair decision tree gives B, as already noted and in accordance with the ID3 algorithm. The Height decision tree is inconclusive but I add here that its four possible 'fuzzy' classifications include D as well as B. I cannot remember if we sought to study C's appearance, but it is quick to see here that if you just completely ignore the Hair attribute, you arrive at C.
Next we addressed the difficult and only vaguely defined issue of 'meaningful generalization'. There is no 'correct' answer among the 16 possible outcomes. There are many good reasons that a human can give to support his/her choice. And I will come back to some of those in §4. But we wanted an objective measure for estimating the relative quality of different generalizations. We called this backward predictive ability, or more briefly, backprediction. For the Quinlan test, backprediction was implemented by taking each of the 16 possible classifications of objects 9,10,11,12 as a classification rule in itself, which is then asked to classify the originally given objects 1 to 8. Randomized neural-net backprediction then ranked the quality of all 16 of the possible classifications. A was best, followed by E, then B, then D, then C. We also performed backprediction using ID3, and humans who had never done or seen the forward generalization test.
There is more in our 1991-1998 papers [1] [2] [3] [4] and the reader is invited to consult them. It seems that our audiences in that period were mostly from the neural network and artificial intelligence communities and also some of the engineering disciplines. Therefore, I would like to advertise our results here for the psychology, economics and social sciences communities. To do so, let me summarize three main contributions as follows.
(1) Economics. Famous Paradoxes: See for example [6, 7, 9] , among others. The Allais Paradox:
Humans violate the von Neumann-Morgenstern EU expected utility axiom. The Ellsberg Paradox: Humans violate the Aumann-Savage SEU subjective utility axiom. Now we have the Bernasconi-Gustafson Paradox: Artificial intelligence violates the HIU human intuition utility. Put another way, whereas humans are sometimes 'blamed' for not measuring up to the economic utility models, our results show that humans possess what I have called here superior intuitive utility models. I will elaborate in §4. (2) Social sciences. The Quality of Generalization: Our backprediction method is always available to any venue of learning or generalization or prediction or forecasting, given the data from which one has learned, generalized, predicted, or forecasted. (3) Psychology. The Overriding Importance of Context in Human Psychology: We felt this to be such an important and inescapable conclusion derived from our research that we chose to state it as follows [4] . A major implication of our findings is that humans overwhelmingly seek, create or imagine context in order to provide meaning when presented with abstract or apparently incomplete or contradictory or otherwise untenable situations.
I will expand on all three of these claims in §4 where the general question will be asked 'What is actually happening?' But let me say a few words here. I have never believed in 'paradoxes'. They only seem so because we do not understand well enough the phenomenon or have mis-modelled it or have overly confined the context in which we pose it. As an example, I can do no better than to refer the reader to my paper [14] where I show why famous claimed solution 'blow-ups' are really just due to a convenient assumption allowing interesting but misleading results and papers.
Our backprediction method is admittedly in hindsight akin to the method of cross-correlation. But we have no predesigned control group. 
Quantum methods in psychology and economics
The two books [6, 7] provide an excellent background for the recent introduction of concepts and methods from quantum mechanics into certain issues in psychology and economics, as well as large bibliographies. As usual in this paper I want to focus on context, and then on imagination. So, let us examine how the notion of context enters into these two treatments of the general issues of quantum cognition learning and decision making within psychology and economics.
The word 'context' carries with it a number of understandings of what it is intended to mean. You will find in [4, §3] a careful discussion of the semiotics of the word 'context'. For a workable definition sufficient to our needs and with sufficient generality for many other situations, we settled upon context to mean: a setting and its meaning.
We also proposed a rule for determining the intended meaning of context in any situation: change the context a bit in your situation to better determine its intended meaning.
Being clear about intended or even unintended context can greatly aid one's understanding of any written exposition. Myself included, often we write our thoughts or results within a context implicit within our mind but not explicitly stated for the reader.
I assume in my following remarks that the reader is perusing the two books [6, 7] under discussion and has some familiarity with the quantum mechanical background implicitly assumed within those books' treatments.
In [6] we find the term 'context' indexed to three occurrences. At pages 154-156 in Chapter 5: 'Quantum-inspired models of concept combinations', the SCOP model (state-context-property) is treated. It is assumed that all concepts have prototypical 'ground states', which can represent them within graded category structures. Then compositional semantics are seen in a framework of tensor products within which states are 'intersected' via projection operators. The motivation seems to be (my words, as throughout this paper) to model linguistic semantics in analogy to entangled states of quantum theory. The rest of Chapter 5 then broadens its perspective to the comparison of semantic non-compositionality to the non-factorizability of probabilistic joint distributions and to generalized Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSC) inequalities, originally in [16] .
The context here is the analogy with the entangled states setting of quantum mechanics. The other two occurrences of context occur in Chapter 7: 'Quantum-like models of human semantic space'. The goal there is to model human memory as superposed states in a Hilbert space. From pages 191-194 we are led to choose a particular vector basis for the situation at hand, for example, a particular orientation of a measuring apparatus. Then at pages 205-208 a particular meaning of a concept or word is seen as a projection of a more general conceptual subspace, including all possible contexts in which the word or concept might occur. The context here is the analogy with the quantum collapse postulate in a quantum measurement.
I will say more about these models and modelling in §4. Turning to [7] , let me remind readers that I happily wrote one of the Forewords to that book and that I think the attempted application of quantum thinking and quantum methods to disciplines within the social sciences is a noble cause. I mention that because in this paper I am taking a more rigorous tone, 'raising the bar' to ask for more substantial justifications of the enterprise. In § §4 and 5, I will chastise everyone, including myself, for not understanding well enough key underlying dynamics that 'are actually happening'. This is especially so in human decision making.
Returning to [7] , the notion of context and its importance and specification are more in evidence. Therefore, rather than detailing each occurrence, let me try to summarize a bit. There is a nice discussion (p. 23) about Heisenberg's thinking context as that of formal models as contrasted to Bohr's thinking context as that of experiments-I add here, sometimes just thoughtexperiments he would pose to frustrate Einstein! We find (p. 125) the important clarification that the Kolmogorov probability model and its axioms may be seen conceptually as that of embedding a set of complex conditions preceding a needed decision-making task into a single probability space. This is Kolmogorov's famous event space, which all students in their first finite-math course learn to enjoy when taking coloured balls from urns. Contextual probability is carefully set (p. 128) within a definite prescribed context C: 'a complex of conditions, for instance, physical, social, financial'.
Of course, one of the authors of [7] had already written his book [17] . Let me recall his constructive wave function approach, briefly mentioned on p. 144 in [7] , because I will want to refer to it later. That approach features a quantum-like Hamiltonian evolution going forward in time starting from a known initial wave function ψ(0) within a given experimental context. Quantum interference effects can then be related to known classical but puzzling cognitive situations.
I will take the overall context of [7] to be that of comparison of Kolmogorov probability with quantum probability. Specific sub-contexts are to be seen as exact specifications of specific experimental set-ups, à la Bohr's inclinations.
On a larger scale, I may put [6] into the general context of psychology, and [7] more into the context of economics. The distance between economics and finance is not large, and is shrinking, and in that vein I want now to bring in Kreps' little book [9] . That book and its author are revered within the financial risk community. Within that community, there is a constant tug-ofwar between those who want to assume and rely upon utility theory, and those who do not. See the account in my book ( [8] , Chapter 12).
When you read [9] you will find that a critical issue is raised in Chapter 10, that of 'taking actions contingent upon new information'. This is what you must do every day in the investment business. Savage theory is assumed to be adequate and one faces a (p. 141) Savage-style decision problem. The standard procedure is outlined and then subjected to a number of provocative questions (p. 144) to set the tone for deeper considerations to follow in the book. I will come back to this in §4.
As a last topic for this section, we should go back to the decision tree methods as were treated in §2 and get some taste for any extensions to a quantum framework. In [18] a general quantum version of a decision tree classifier is formulated. A quantum entropy criterion is employed to decide which is the preferred top attribute, analogous to the procedure used by ID3. But before that can be done, large quantum datasets must be clustered into quantum states. For that, it is proposed to use a quantum fidelity metric. Grover's algorithm from quantum computing theory is to be used to seek the largest information gain.
We may say that the context there is definitely that of quantum computing and its known theoretical algorithm speed-up potential.
On the other hand, Montanaro [19] shows that almost all such decision tree architectures do not, however, allow significant quantum speed-up. The argument there is that of showing that, with high probability, the average sensitivity of a random decision tree is high. This is even the case for short decision trees.
I remember from my days in neural networks that even just the loading of a three-inputnode neural net can be NP-complete. And quantum complexity by itself can be a very tricky thing. Then when you actually try to build a large quantum neural network, including optimally implementing features for parallelizability, you will find great challenges, as we did in the wonderful big project I described briefly in §2.
What is actually happening?
What is actually happening is a much harder proposition. But it is worth pushing for, hoping for at least some better understandings or partial answers. Any such understanding should then greatly enhance any modelling of anything. Illustrations of good questions for delving deeper 
new idea, or in the economic realm, what are the key emotions of each trader as they unwittingly cooperate to drive a stock price to a mean-reverting equilibrium? I find it always interesting and challenging to probe deeper into seeking the hidden micro-dynamics underlying macro-events.
Let us separate what is actually happening in decision making into two contexts: machines and humans. I am directing attention primarily to the latter. Of course, the electronic flashing away within the computer and the algorithms running in them are things that are happening. And they are important to better understand at the level of their specific dynamics if one has been tasked with improving their design. But I want to concentrate here on human reasoning, especially decision making, as I have already been discussing in this paper, and in accordance with the principal theme of this conference and theme issue.
So, let us dispense with the machines with a statement that machines do not think-they have no consciousness, they have no unconscious, and in particular they have no imagination.
Moreover, I want to draw a clear line between models and thinking. I have found that most of the research in quantum cognition and most of the literature in quantum information are modelling, rather than succeeding to understand and explain at a deeper level, what is actually happening. Even the much-heralded cellular automata that came onto the scene a few decades ago can only self-organize according to the primitives you put in. Models do permit simulations, approximations, theories, optimizations and mathematics, but for the most part they are not reality.
We were led to investigate reality, what is actually happening, in our experiment described in §2, when we decided to ask the participants, at the last moment as they handed back their classification questionnaire, to 'just jot down at the bottom what you did' but 'only if you feel like it'. The latter phrase was added because we did not want to induce just some kind of testtaking manufactured answer. Some of the many interesting human responses are collected in our papers [3, 4] . They helped us to design the additional experiments reported in [4] .
Speaking of reality, what actually happened when I suddenly thrust our Quinlan test at the conferees at the beginning of my opening lecture at the conference? Here is what happened. Of the 14 who returned the questionnaire, eight classified according to A (−+−−), one did C (−−−−), one did D (−+−+), and four chose among the other 11 less frequently reported classifications. Thus even this small sample was consistent with all of our other small samples conducted under a wide range of conditions. The exception was that no one chose the ID3 preferred classification B (−+++). Even that is consistent with the result we reported in [4] (Tables 2 and 3 ) of no one choosing B when we made the Quinlan test completely abstract. No one chose D there either. Draw your own conclusions. They will not be unique.
What was my motivation in springing on the audience without warning the Quinlan test and asking them to actually do it? The answer is in the italics. The corollaries were to get them into the spirit of my talk and more generally into the intellectual setting of the conference and in particular into a context of actual decision making.
Let us move on, to look back at §3. Here I can only register a few observations and suggestions for good questions to better understand what is actually happening.
Regarding [6] and the modelling in Chapters 5 and 7, a natural question delving deeper into what may actually be accomplished in real situations is: How do you actually determine your context-setting vector bases? Experience teaches that often you need the natural eigenbasis inherent to the problem, and even close approximations to that can sometimes cause havoc. For spin measurements, the Pauli matrices come to mind. But for human experiments, beyond just setting up small matrix toy models with the standard basis, your choice of a good basis carries with it an implied good context for description. Singular value decomposition, that is, principal component analysis, also known as empirical orthogonal decomposition for actual physical application, owes its importance to what I have just said. The next question then is: How do you innovate to enlarge context as your phenomenon under study evolves? You do not want to just ignore new information. In this connection I mention a recent paper [20] where we innovate with our time operator.
Do you really think that humans actually do linguistic semantics with entangled-state-like tensor products? As I will describe in §5, there seem to be better models.
As to the CHSH inequalities, in my recent book ([21] , Chapter 7) you will find my research and interpretation of their meaning and my desire to understand them at a deeper level by insisting on making every inequality into an equality. This means that you actually have to find the 'slack' variables in each. Those then give you valuable insight about what information you were previously missing.
I doubt that humans actually do geometrical quantum-like projection operations within Hilbert space word subspaces. But humans can do sort algorithms on small samples. An example is the pause to choose the most appropriate word among several that come to mind during a conversation. And we definitely 'collapse' complexity to simplicity as evidenced in our experiment of §2.
Regarding [7] , I mentioned in §3 Khrennikov's constructive wave function approach, which he presents in more detail in [17] . I would like to observe that all future contexts are determined by the initial wave function ψ(0). What I mean by this comes from my sharpened Born theory for the evolution of quantum probabilities; see [22] . My theorem establishes that when you exponentiate a Hamiltonian to its unitary time evolution, that unitary group U(t) exactly preserves the domain D(H) of the unbounded Hamiltonian operator into the future. That is, U(t) maps D(H) one-toone onto D(H) for all time, and maps the complement of D(H) onto itself too. So, your context is D(H) forever and no new innovative information can enter. In Khrennikov's scenario, a mental wave function ψ C is to go forward in a quantum-like way via a Schrödinger-like evolution, measurement, updating and so on. According to my theorem, if he wants to enlarge context, he will have to stop his evolution and bring in a new Hamiltonian with some different domain. This may seem a subtle point but domains are everything when dealing with unbounded, e.g. differential, Hamiltonian operators.
At this very moment in this writing, I have just read an article [23] on brain research at UC Santa Barbara that confirms that your 'Brain knows how to stop thinking, start learning'. You must get out of your usual routine, your usual 'rut', to enlarge context.
At the end of §2, I highlighted three points and said I would come back to expand on them later. The third was the importance of context, a theme running throughout this paper. The second point was our backprediction method. I postulate that most humans, when making a decision, often do actually that, even unconsciously. You sometimes hear the explanation 'I just bounced back and forth before I made the decision'. I take this as one facet of my HIU human intuition utility that I advanced when I spoke of the famous paradoxes.
In the literature you will find some explanations that 'excuse' humans for not following various expected utility models. My HIU is to include 'robustness' in the sense of [24] . I have just found his work and in particular the book's Chapter 11: 'Robust-Satisficing Behavior', in which he gives his resolutions of the Ellsberg and Allais paradoxes. I cannot go into detail here, but the key is to give up simple optimization criteria and bring in a robustness function. The important statement is that 'agents facing severe uncertainty will robust-satisfice rather than optimize'. Satisficing seems to be a new term in cognitive heuristics that means to search through available alternatives until an acceptable solution is obtained. I might paraphrase it with an older phrase: 'settle for what works'. I have learned in my projects with engineers that the robustness of an algorithm, meaning it usually will work within a rather wide context of experimental conditions and data, is a property held in much higher regard than existence, uniqueness or even convergence.
Humans develop a robust intuition through the experiences of their lives and activities. I cannot speak for others but I am usually quite satisfied to find solutions that work. I even note in my autobiography [8] that in retrospect I have discovered that I am an 'improviser' as contrasted to an 'initiator'. I will take risks but survive by keeping them within, in the terms of this paper, my human intuitive utility robustness bounds. In [9] , Kreps keeps wonderfully tossing questions back to the reader, questions of the genre of 'Would you actually do that?' He is asking the readers to test theory against their human intuition utilities. And he is using a form of backprediction.
Imagination
If I have made my case for the importance of context in decision making, be it artificial, quantum or human, then we must probe deeper into how context is actually formulated.
From the experiment of §2 we have many examples collected from humans, some of them reproduced in [3, 4] . Imagination played a key role in how they formulated a context from which to divine their answer.
Let us therefore ask: What is actually happening in imagination? For that question, we must first establish a context. I will take the mind as context. In particular, I will assume that imagination resides in and takes place in the mind.
Over the years and centuries many great thinkers have researched, wondered and especially philosophized about the human mind. We are interested here in a more specific issue, that of what is actually going on in the mind during the process of imagination. That in itself is a large subject, so to 'cut to the quick', I will take a big shortcut and start from the interesting manifesto of Grenander [25] . For the uninitiated, he was a pure mathematician and statistician who switched his focus to trying to mathematically model the human mind. He was so convinced of the merits of that quest that (rumour has it) he even influenced the extremely strong pure mathematician (Fields Medal, algebraic geometry) David Mumford to join him in that quest. See [8] for the account of my interaction with Mumford in Vietnam in which I learned of his interest in pattern learning and the wider scope of mathematics.
Here are some famous theories of mind according to Grenander: Aristotle (syllogisms); Boole (formal logics); Freud (emotions); Quillen (semantic networks); Chomsky (formal grammars); Watson (behaviourism). Certainly there are many more. I would add Pitt (parallel distributed processing).
Grenander [25] models the human mind as a vast graph of thoughts. Thoughts include logical reasoning, emotions, body sensations, etc., establishing a rather wide context in which to proceed. Concepts, patterns and ideas are basic nodes to be linked together to form a thought. That primary mental activity is to precede any formulation of thoughts into words. Intelligence is the ability to connect thoughts. Intelligent thinking is thus realized in a connected mind-space graph-like network of large and small cliques. He has also developed software to try to implement his model. But when you search Grenander's book, you do not find any good modelling of imagination. The best he can offer is the introduction of a very general chaos, and that leads to nowhere in his model.
Another interesting recent view of the mind is put forth by Kurzweil [26] . His view is that about 300 million patterns have been stored in our neocortex during ages 0 to 21. Thought is the recognizing of patterns from that huge memory bank. My impression is that IBM's impressive Watson computing system is to operate in a similar way, with access to all the patterns in the Internet.
But I find no treatment of imagination by Kurzweil. In Chapter 11 (which is his rebuttal to criticism by Paul Allen, of Microsoft, and others, to his thesis), Kurzweil asserts a 'linear nature of human intuition' and, from that, accuses his accusers of not being 'exponential'. I find such argumentation to be nonsense. Still searching for some grasp of 'imagination' within his treatment, I find under 'creativity' that (p. 113) 'the neocortex is a great metaphor machine'. That gives me some hope. But then Kurzweil posits that each of the 300 million pattern recognizers in our neocortex 'is essentially a metaphor'. To me, such a statement is brute-force artificial intelligence gone mad.
Here, without attribution, are some thoughts on imagination by some of the great thinkers: Kant (when thought and experience come together), Hume (when ideas become united with experience), Sartre (that which bridges the sensory to the intellectual), Aristotle (thought combined with art), Shelley (the expression of human experience), Coleridge (how we see the world) and Einstein (more important than knowledge).
Imagination is implemented by daydreaming, fantasizing, dreaming, pretending, mental imaging, travelling and counterfactualizing among others. More important, here are some reallife contexts conducive to imagination: curiosity, optimism, richness of experiences, bilingualism, openness of perspective, perseverance, purpose, passion and, one of the most important in my opinion, motivation.
One can easily visualize a nice triangular diagram in which information, intuition and imagination are all linked and indeed interlocked. To fix ideas, let us think of information as a big data bank, e.g. along the lines of Kurzweil, and, again oversimplified, of intuition as based upon experience. We leave imagination as a 'module' not yet well-enough understood to model. Somehow my proposed HIU human intuition utility takes advantage of such architectures to perform some decision-making tasks in ways more robust than artificial or quantum methods.
Conclusion
The quality of decision making in economics and psychology depends upon the ability to formulate an appropriate context. The ability to formulate the appropriate context depends upon imagination. Imagination is seen as a key component within a concept of human intuitive utility that enables superior human decision making compared to those of machine, model and quantum methods in some situations. To do so, humans invoke imagination to broaden context in selective, creative and useful ways.
